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Clearing the Ground: Spurious Attacks and
Genuine Issues in the Debate about Philosophy
in a Post-Colonial Society
André du Toit
Department of Political Studies
University of Cape Town
One
For anyone somewhat in touch with the philosophical community in South
Africa it must come as a surprise to learn that analytical philosophy has been
under attack, and needs to be defended against its "critics". The very idea of
attacking or defending "analytical philosophy" now seems strange and dated; a
generation or two ago there was no lack of critics, nor of defences and
counterattacks, but much has changed in the philosophical world since then.
There was a time when analytical philosophy was more controversial, both
abroad and in the local South African situation. Logical positivism had a definite
programmatic aspect and the young Freddy Ayer delighted in spelling out its
radical implications in Language, Truth and Logic (Ayer 1936). Other erstwhile
members of the Vienna Circle vigorously pursued the ideals of "unified science" at
major teaching universities in the United States. In a different way Popper aligned
his notion of the open society to the conflict with fascism and totalitarianism while
his approach to the logic of scientific discovery was taken up and extended by new
generations of philosophers and scientists alike. After the Second World War
analytical philosophy for a while achieved a certain hegemony, with the linguistic
philosophy of the later Wittgenstein and J.L.Austin making an especially marked
impact. This was the time when Oxford became a sort of philosophical capital of
the world, attracting considerable numbers of able and ambitious young
philosophers from America and elsewhere who went on to become leading figures
in contemporary philosophy. Even into the 1970s analytical philosophy retained a
certain programmatic aspect, though by then leading figures such as Quine and
Davidson were located in the United States.
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However, over the last two decades much has changed on the philosophical
scene; in various ways the era of "post-analytical philosophy", to cite the title of an
influential book edited by Cornel West and other younger philosophers (Rajchman
and West 1985), has arrived. This does not mean that analytical philosophy has
been superceded; indeed, in one form or another it remains the mainstream
orientation in contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world and even
beyond. But this has long since ceased to be controversial; analytical philosophy is
accepted as part of the furniture, so to speak. At the same time the dividing lines
between analytical philosophy and its rivals or opponents have become much more
blurred. Richard Rorty, once the editor of The Linguistic Turn (Rorty 1967), a
standard collection of key texts of analytical philosophy, went on to become a
leading figure of deconstructionism, while more generally the impact of
postmodernist philosophy served to diminish the preoccupations with the more
programmatic and methodological aspects of analytical pliilosophy that had
characterised an earlier era. Jon Elster, Gerry Cohen and others have reinterpreted
Marx and Marxism in analytical vein, leading to a distinct school of "analytical
Marxism". Even such renowned "obscurantist" philosophers as Hegel and
Heidegger have been the object of considerable analytical work and interest, so that
these days it is hard to tell where the boundaries between analytical and non-
analytical philosophy are to be found.
In any case, nowadays it seems of lesser importance whether such boundaries
can be drawn, and much of the fun has gone out of comparing analytical
philosophy to its philosophical rivals given the more general crisis facing the
discipline of philosophy itself. In England, and elsewhere too, philosophy has fallen
on hard times. It has been especially hard hit by the Thatcherhe rationalisation of
the universities, with philosophy departments, too, having to justify their continued
existence in market-related terms. Oxford is no longer the kind of philosophical
centre it used to be; many of its leading figures have taken up positions elsewhere
and it is no longer automatically attracting the best young philosophical minds of
the coming generation. Increasingly philosophers are looking to fields like applied
ethics for their future prospects. In these developments, too, analytical philosophy
has had an important part to play, and will no doubt continue to do so - that much
is uncontroversial - but that does not mean that the "relevance" of analytical
philosophy in particular is at all a pressing concern. On the contrary, the issues run
both wider and deeper than the concerns of an essentially inward-looking
philosophical rivalry.
clearing the ground 35
In the South African context, too, a similar story could be told. A generation
ago the dividing lines between analytical and non-analytical philosophers were
much more sharply drawn. Some philosophy departments at Afrikaans universities
continued to practice a more traditional approach to philosophy in terms of "life
and world views" of a more metaphysical bent or aligned to different religious and
cosmological perspectives. In general the Afrikaans philosophy departments tended
to be oriented towards "Continental" traditions, while their counterparts at the
University of Cape Town or the Witwatersrand were more attuned to the Anglo-
Saxon world, though this did not necessarily mean that it took the form of
analytical philosophy (at UCT, for example, as late as the early 1970s the senior
positions in the Philosophy Department were still held by Andrew Murray, Martin
Versfeld and S.I.M.du Plessis, hardly a trio of analytical philosophers). The impact
of analytical philosophy came relatively late, and it was really only from the 1960s
that the Meyers at Unisa, Jonathan Suzman at Wits and especially Daantjie
Oosthuizen at Rhodes established a strong analytical presence on the South
African philosophical scene. To begin with, that presence was decidedly
controversial; analytical philosophers had to contend not only with more traditional
approaches to philosophy, but also with colleagues strongly committed to rival new
approaches such as phenomenology (and/or existentialism) and even, occasionally,
(Neo)Marxism.
In this context polemical exchanges and programmatic or methodological
discussions tended to proliferate; analytical philosophers explicitly and implicitly
developed strong critiques of rival philosophical approaches, and they in turn had
their critics. These philosophical differences were compounded by the political and
ideological conflicts of an apartheid society, so that the South African
philosophical community was quite strongly polarised. It was only with difficulty
that a common professional organisation for philosophers could be founded by the
late 1960s, and even then there was a marked difference between the annual
congresses of the South African Philosophical Society, which somehow made room
for many different philosophical persuasions, and the more informal "Spring
Colloquia" where mainly analytical philosophers gathered. It was a well-known
fact of life that there were philosophy departments where analytical philosophers
were not welcome, and vice versa.
It is with some relief that one can say that this is no longer an accurate
description of the South African philosophical scene, and has not been that for
quite some time. Here, too, the philosophical community is much less polarised and
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in different ways the dividing lines have become much more blurred. These days
more or less analytically trained philosophers can be found in Afrikaans and other
philosophy departments as well, while Rhodes for a number of years made a place
for a Calvinist philosopher and at Wits Foucault is taught as; part of the regular
curriculum. The South African Journal of Philosophy typically carries an eclectic
mix of articles with analytical contributions rubbing shoulders with less or non-
analytical articles {philosophical Papers, by contrast, is self-consciously a journal
of analytical philosophy in a fairly pronounced sense, but hardly functions in the
South African context: it is in effect an international journal which so happens to
be published at Wits). In South Africa, too, postmodernism and deconstruction
have had an impact in shifting attention away from more methodological and
programmatic preoccupations, though that impact has been greater outside
philosophy departments than within them.1 Perhaps the one department which still
has a markedly "analytical" identity is the Philosophy department at UCT. The
more significant developments and initiatives of recent yeairs, such as Johan
Mouton's Methodology and Interdisciplinary Philosophy Programmes at the
HSRC or the founding of the Social Theory group, can not really be characterised
in analytical or non-analytical terms. Similarly the more successful workshops of
the last few years, such as those organised in conjunction with the visits of John
Thompson and Charles Taylor, typically involved philosophers who cut across any
remaining lines between analytical and non-analytical philosophy.
All of this does not mean that philosophy in South Africa is flourishing; on the
contrary, here, too, philosophy has fallen on increasingly hard times and warning
lights are flickering. In 1995, for the first time in four decades, the annual
Philosophy Congress had to be cancelled, and meetings of the "Spring Colloquia"
have also become more sporadic and unfocused. Some philosophy departments,
including UCT, have experienced difficulties in filling chairs; in other cases the
indications are that chairs may well not be filled at all. In general, philosophy
departments are facing major problems connected with the rapidly changing nature
of the student body at South African universities, combined with the increasing
pressures on scarce resources in the university context. In the South Africa of the
1990s philosophers are hard pressed to justify a continuation of the central place
which philosophy used to lay claim to in the university; it is net too much to say
that, unless appropriate changes in the location, curriculum and methods of
teaching can be found which relate to the current political context and job market,
this traditional role may well be at risk. In short, philosophy in South Africa is
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feeing a real crisis - but one that has little or nothing to do with the lines dividing
analytical philosophers from their non-analytical colleagues; the programmatic
battles which once raged amongst them have long since lost any remaining
urgency.
So how does one understand and explain Denise Meyerson's account
(Meyerson this volume)2 of an embattled analytical philosophy in need of defence
against its hostile and uninformed critics? For this is the central contention and
abiding preoccupation of an otherwise excellent paper. Meyerson has much to say
that is of genuine interest about the current state of philosophy, but it is
unfortunately all pressed into service for a spirited defence of analytical philosophy
against its philosophical rivals as well as popular prejudice and misconceptions. At
first blush it is tempting to see this as an anachronistic curiosity, a resurrection of
the polemics of yesteryear by a belated protagonist who is blithely unaware of the
feet that the caravan has long since moved on. Nor is Meyerson's version of the
"critics" of analytical philosophy calculated to convince one of the gravity of any
threat posed by them. Her evidence for this "attack" effectively consists of an
article by Robert Paul Wolff from 1986 (Wolff 1986-7) and some scattered
writings by myself as critic-in-chief. The piece by Wolff was an impressionistic
account based on his experience of some South African philosophy departments
during a visit in that year, ft certainly presented a rather jaundiced view of the state
of philosophy in South Africa at the time, coloured by Wolff's personal perspective
on the anti-apartheid struggle and the academic boycott. If an answer to this
broadside was needed, it has been provided by Seumas Millar and Ian MacDonald
and also published in The Philosophical Forum in 1990 (Miller and MacDonald
1990). There does not seem any pressing need to revive this particular polemic at
the present time. This leaves myself as the main and, in effect, sole "critic" against
whom analytical philosophy has to be defended. The evidence here consists of a
paper originally written as long ago as 1976 (du Toit 1982), my inaugural lecture
of 1988 (du Toit 1988a) and a contribution to a 1987 workshop on "Philosophy in
South Africa" that was never even published (du Toit 1987). ft can easily be
ascertained that neither of the published papers dealt specifically with analytical
philosophy or set out to develop a serious critique of it, though en passant they
certainly contained critical remarks of various kinds, as they did of many other
aspects of philosophy in South Africa as well.
That, then, appears to be the sum of the purported attack on analytical
philosophy in South Africa, at least on Meyerson's own account: a polemical
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broadside by an American philosopher passing through some years ago (and which
has long since been rebutted by others), and some critical remarks made in passing
by myself, in one case almost a decade ago, and in the other case going on for
twenty years ago. This hardly amounts to anything like an urgent threat or a
concerted attack. Meyerson repeatedly refers to "popular" misconceptions about
the nature of analytical philosophy, and to critical views "common enough in South
African academic circles" (Meyerson, this volume: 1). This sounds like par for the
course, and no particular reason for undue concern. Certainly Meyerson gives no
indication why these "popular" prejudices and misconceptions have suddenly
become of more consequence, nor does she make any serious attempt to uncover
their sources or to show why and how they are likely to do damage. It is to the
views and arguments of her two "critics", Wolff and du Toit, that she devotes all
her defensive efforts. In short, on the face of it there is no clear need to mount a
defence of analytical philosophy at this time or against these particular "critics".
The puzzle deepens if we consider who and what Meyerson purports to be
defending. I suppose it is conceivable that there might still be some old-fashioned
analytical philosophers around who, in defiance of more general changes in the
philosophical climate, remain committed to the verificationist principle, or perhaps
to the Quine/Davidson programme, to the exclusion of anything else as philosophy
proper. Such "purist" and hardline analytical philosophers would certainly have
cause to feel embattled in a context where eclectic postmodernists are let loose,
while others press for philosophy to be made relevant to the South African context
and/or to develop programmes of applied ethics, etc. They would also have good
reason to take my critical strictures in the papers cited by Meyerson as applicable
to their own position. But according to her paper this is not Meyerson's own view
of analytical philosophy. She takes pains to reject any insular or monolithic
approach to analytical philosophy, instead stressing its continuities with the
classical mainstream of philosophy as well as the need to be open to other
traditions and disciplines. Indeed, she offers a rather attractive and open-minded
conception of analytical philosophy in particular, and more generally of the task of
philosophy in the South African context. This is a conception of analytical
philosophy which I, for one, would have no difficulty in endorsing. Indeed, in some
respects it is in line with the views in precisely those papers of mine cited by her.
Certainly, on this conception of it, one must wonder how anyone could possibly
object to analytical philosophy, except perhaps some atavistic positivist, or perhaps
a radical deconstructionist.
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So just who are the South African analytical philosophers Meyerson is
defending? On a narrow interpretation of analytical philosophy, this would
probably include a handful of philosophers mainly at Wits, Rhodes and UCT. On a
more inclusive interpretation, though, such as that professed by Meyerson herself,
the range could be considerably larger, perhaps even including myself. On this
view, my own critical remarks would then appear in a different light, not as an
attack by a "critic" of analytical philosophy as such, but as part of an internal
debate among, and with, analytical philosophers.
There is a further possibility - that Meyerson is not entirely consistent or open
about her identification of analytical philosophy and tends to shift between its
narrower and more inclusive interpretations according to the needs of her
argument. Thus she could view herself as belonging to the small handful of
"purist" analytical philosophers in South Africa who might well feel a need for a
defence of some kind against their "critics", real or imagined. But when it comes to
an explicit characterisation she invokes the catholic and non-monolithic description
of analytical philosophy which, if at all serious, would obviate any need for defence
since it would already encompass the purported "critics". If so, then this will not do
at all: if a narrow and "purist" conception of analytical philosophy might well be in
need of a defence, then this cannot be achieved by the sleight of hand of shifting the
ground to a more catholic and relaxed definition of analytical philosophy itself.
And if she is serious about that more inclusive definition of analytical philosophy,
then this must apply both to her own practice as well as to her dealings with the
purported "critics" of analytical philosophy.
Either way there is ample ground for a closer analysis of Meyerson's paper. I
would not like simply to charge her with the transparent ploys of inventing "critics"
of analytical philosophy in South Africa when they no longer exist, and then to
mount a defence of analytical philosophy in the name of an inclusive and catholic
conception of it when what is really at stake is a rearguard action on behalf of a
rather different and beleaguered little group of analytical purists. We need to look
more closely at just what is involved in her characterisation of analytical
philosophy, and then we need to test this in various ways. On the one hand we need
to see how this characterisation would apply to the track record of such purported
"critics" of analytical philosophy as myself. And on the other hand we need to see
to what extent her own practice in this article, i.e. her account of the positions of
the purported "critics" of analytical philosophy, actually exemplifies a narrower or
a more relaxed conception of analytical philosophy itself. The proof of the pudding
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is in the eating of it, and there can be no better test of the sincerity of Meyerson's
profession of an inclusive and relaxed conception of analytical philosophy man to
see whether she practices what she preaches when she attempts to give an account
of the purported "critics" of analytical philosophy. Still, all this is not merely a
matter of possibly catching her out; explicitly and by implication Meyerson's
article raises a number of critical issues regarding the current state and the possible
role of philosophy in South Africa which go well beyond just the question of
analytical philosophy. These substantive issues need to be properly addressed, but
that can hardly happen as long as a series of misunderstandings and
misrepresentations, both of analytical philosophy itself and of its "critics", get in
the way. The purpose of this reply is thus not simply polemical; rather it aims to
clear the way for the kind of substantive discussion which is actually needed.
I propose to proceed in the following way. First I will briefly reconstruct
Meyerson's account of analytical philosophy as well as of the dilemmas and
challenges faced by philosophers in the South African context. Secondly I will then
provide something in the way of an intellectual autobiography, especially regarding
my own relation to analytical philosophy, as a test case of sorts for Meyerson's
characterisation of analytical philosophy. I will argue that on her own criterion, so
far from being a hostile and uninformed "critic" of analytical philosophy, there
should be little difficulty in accommodating me within the fold of this more catholic
and relaxed conception of analytical philosophy. In turn this will lead on to the
question how Meyerson could have arrived at such a systematic and wholesale
misrepresentation of my own position, and have done so on the basis of some of
my own writings. This will involve a critical assessment of her philosophical
practice, at least in the present paper, and thus provide a different kind of test case
of her professed conception of analytical philosophy. Finally, once the
misunderstandings have been removed and the misrepresentaticns set straight, we
can retum to the substantive questions conceming the dilemmas and challenges of
(analytical) philosophy in the South African context. This should surely be the
main business, but on this occasion we unfortunately cannot take it up directly.
Two
Consider first the rather attractive and open-minded conception of analytical
philosophy in particular, and more generally of the task of philosophy in the
South African context, provided in Meyerson's paper. Meyerson takes pains
to distance herself from any narrow or purist conception of analytical
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philosophy. She strongly insists that analytical philosophy should by no means
be confused with the programmatic doctrines of logical positivism or with the
special preoccupations of ordinary language analysis which happened to be
influential at earlier stages of the 20th century. On her account analytical
philosophy is a broad church encompassing quite different kinds of
philosophical work done in the Anglo-American world; it can be represented
by philosophers otherwise as different as Russell, Carnap, Putnam, Quine,
Davidson, Rawls and Dworkin and it has no difficulty in finding allies among
linguists like Chomsky. In truth, "analytic philosophy is merely the
continuation in the twentieth century of a tradition which goes back to the
Greeks" (Meyerson this volume: 15); as such it can legitimately lay claim to
the mainstream heritage of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Hume and
Kant, while the easiest way to bring out its distinctive features is to reflect
briefly on the Socratic method (Meyerson this volume: 15f). Meyerson thus
clearly rejects any "monolithic conception" of analytical philosophy, and
accepts the implication that there can be no sharp divide between analytical
and non-analytical philosophy.
Moreover, Meyerson accepts the challenge that (analytical) philosophy, thus
broadly conceived, should engage with local and concrete issues arising from the
society in which it is practised. Categorically she states that
it would be a poor form of philosophy which had nothing interesting to say about the
society in which it is practised, and which was incapable of contributing positively to
social transformation (Meyerson, this volume:9).
And again:
philosophy should illuminate matters of local importance, and a refusal or inability to
reflect on the particular historical circumstances we inhabit would seriously
impoverish our philosophy (Meyerson this volume:22).
On her understanding of the nature of analytical philosophy it should be clear
how and why philosophy can and should take on these tasks, she contends,
since it is a major insight of mature analytical philosophy that, contrary to
verificationist dogmas, there is "no clear way to separate conceptual and
empirical investigations", thus opening the way for "concrete" applications of
philosophical explorations of meaning (Meyerson this volume:0). Since all
philosophising involves the exploration of meanings, not only at verbal level
but as a systematic and critical questioning of the assumptions of prevailing
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beliefs, it constitutes "an enterprise...with enormous potential to alter
substantive beliefs" (Meyerson this volume: 14). In this way Meyerson sees her
own task in terms of
demonstrating just how satisfyingly analytical philosophy can engage with social and
political issues, and have an impact on the world (Meyerson this volume: 14).
Moreover, she recognises that the particularities of the South African context
poses special problems in this regard:
The fact is that all South African social theorists and philosophers, of whatever
persuasion, are working in the same context and face the same problem: we depend
inevitably on overseas work and we need to be sensitive to the problems created by
that (Meyerson this volume:28).
In short, Meyerson proposes a catholic and inclusive conception of analytical
philosophy; it is important to her that philosophy thus conceived can and
should be made "relevant" to social and political practices, and might even
contribute to "social transformation"; and she recognises that the South
African context poses some special problems in this regard. Broadly speaking,
this is an approach which should fit quite comfortably with my own
background and track record as a South African philosopher, as the next
section may briefly show.
Three
The extent to which I would consider myself an "analytical philosopher" has
never been a particular concern to me; it would very much depend on the way
in which this term is defined. Certainly, on some of the more narrow and purist
conceptions of analytical philosophy I would never qualify. But on a
conception as catholic and non-monolithic as that espoused by Meyerson, I
should have no problems: analytical philosophy in this sense has been part and
parcel of my training, research, teaching and writing for more than three
decades. A brief survey of my own philosophical career could thus provide
something of a test case for Meyerson's relaxed conception of analytical
philosophy, and may also throw some light on the ways in which the local
philosophical scene has changed during that time.
It would be incorrect to claim that contemporary analytical philosophy featured
prominently in my initial undergraduate training in philosophy at Stellenbosch in
the late 1950s. On the other hand, our curriculum at the time was solidly grounded
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in precisely that mainstream tradition of classical philosophy, with Socrates and
Kant providing the key reference points, which Meyerson invokes. My Master's
dissertation was on Kierkegaard, but mis did not so much concern the proto-
existentialist philosopher as it did the Kierkegaard of The Concept of Dread
(Kierkegaard 1957), the rigorous analyst of fundamental conceptual categories
harking back to the Kantian roots of Hegel. Around this time I was impressed by a
visit to Stellenbosch by Daantjie Oosfliuizen, then in the process of reinvigorating
the Philosophy Department at Rhodes and beginning to make analytical philosophy
a stronger presence in the South African context than hitherto. What impressed me
about Oosthuizen was not only his masterly demonstration of a more rigorous
analytical approach to the core problems of philosophy, but also the fusion of this
with the classic Socratic spirit. I was especially intrigued by the way in which he
applied these rigorous analytical techniques to current problems of South African
politics and ideology, critically dissecting Piet Meyer's Broederbond philosophy or
the conceptual logic of apartheid rationalisations. His untimely death was a major
blow to the development of analytical philosophy in South Africa, but to my mind
he demonstrated from the outset that there need not be any problem in applying
analytical philosophy in "relevant" ways to South African issues.
For my graduate training in philosophy I went to Leijden University in the
Netherlands. My main purpose was to find a doctoral programme where I could be
exposed to the Continental traditions in philosophy as well as to the increasingly
important developments in Anglo-American analytical philosophy. This worked
well, and I was able to study with Van Peursen as well as with Nuchelmans, long
the foremost exponent of analytical philosophy in the Netherlands and especially
well versed in Carnap's semantic methods and J.L.Austin's theory of speech acts.
The topic of my Ph.D. dissertation was a comparison of the logical philosophy and
methods of the early Bertrand Russell with those of the founding father of
phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. The rationale for mis project was precisely that
it entailed a comparative study of the shared assumptions and common starting
points of the respective methods which later became the hallmarks of analytical
philosophy and the phenomenological movement. In common with the
methodological preoccupations of philosophy at that time, I thus attempted to
construct the basis for a programmatic comparison of analytical philosophy with
phenomenology, though this was essentially conceived as a constructive enterprise
rather than as any kind of hostile critique. In part this concerned highly abstract
and technical issues in logical philosophy, such as Russell's theories of denoting
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and of definite descriptions, leaving me in no uncertainty as to how such apparently
trivial matters as the precise meaning and assumptions involved in the use of a
word like '*the" could be of fundamental importance to philosqphy in a wide range
of different fields and applications. This work in a sense provided my point of entry
as a professional philosopher, my first paper at a Philosophy Congress, and later
my first article published in Philosophical Papers, was on "I.ogic and ontology.
Russell's logical methods for philosophy prior to 1905" (du Toit 1974). And when
the South African Journal of Philosophy was founded some years later, one of the
early issues published my paper on "The critique of psychologism" drawn from the
same research project (du Toit 1983).
Following my appointment to the Department of Political Philosophy at
Stellenbosch in 1969 my main teaching and research interests focused on political
and moral philosophy, with a strong emphasis on the implications and applications
of these in the South African context. However, this did not mean anything like an
exclusive specialisation in these particular sub-disciplines only. Due to the peculiar
set-up at Stellenbosch University the Department of Political Philosophy actually
functioned as a second Philosophy Department, responsible for a full complement
of undergraduate and postgraduate programmes. In practice this meant that for
many years I was responsible for teaching undergraduate courses in logic, in theory
of meaning and philosophy of language, in methodology and Ihe philosophy of
science - in fact for a curriculum typical of an Anglo-American philosophy
department. In a sense the Political Philosophy Department at Stellenbosch
functioned as the local representative of analytical philosophy, and in the small
world of South African philosophy we were quite naturally more closely aligned to
the departments at Rhodes, Wits and UCT than to the other Afrikaans universities.
The basis for this approach was precisely the conviction, which Meyerson also
expresses in her paper, that political philosophy could not be taught as a self-
contained field of specialisation, but had to be firmly rooted in the core disciplines
of mainstream philosophy. I am sure that in the eyes of university administrators
the results may well have appeared anomalous: what was a course on Wittgenstein
doing in the Honours programme of Political Philosophy or, for that matter, even a
Masters dissertation on Quine? I happened to be responsible for both cases, and I
can only say that in terms of my understanding of philosophy and of political
philosophy I could not see how there could be any problem with this.
When it came to political philosophy itself, our approach was again firmly
rooted in the methods and literature of analytical philosophy. Over many years
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(and to this day in the Department of Political Studies at UCT) my teaching has
been based on introducing students at an early stage to elementary logical analysis
and to the method of independent conceptual analysis, broadly derived from
Wittgensteinian assumptions regarding ordinary usage. The idea was (and remains)
that this would equip students with the basic analytical skills needed to deal with
the literature on central political concepts (including many of the standard analyses
produced by political philosophers working in the analytical tradition) in the core
courses on political philosophy. The kind of textbook used as the basis for
intermediate courses was Flathman's Concepts in Social and Political Philosophy,
about as mainstream in analytical philosophy as one could get (Flathman 1973). At
more advanced levels I developed courses specifically focused on the foundations
of political and social theory in the analytical philosophy of language and theories
of meaning. Thus for a number of years from the mid-1970s I taught a course on
"Analytical Social and Political Philosophy" using Pitkin's Wittgenstein and
Justice (Pitkin 1972), Winch's Idea of a Social Science (Winch 1958) and similar
works to develop a Wittgensteinian approach to political philosophy. Apart from
this, more standard courses on Rawls and Dworkin, or more generally on theories
of justice and rights, as well as survey courses in political philosophy, were regular
fere both at undergraduate and Honours level.3
My teaching was certainly not confined to analytical philosophy. I regularly
taught foundation courses on Hegel and Marx, as well as occasional courses on
critical theory, Habermas etc. I also worked hard on developing some courses
which are not usually to be found in analytically oriented philosophy departments,
in particular on South African intellectual and political history. In my Stellenbosch
days this was still largely based on my own research on the history of Afrikaner
political thought, but subsequently at UCT this has developed into a broad survey
of the history of South African political thought and traditions. It is a feature of this
course that local intellectual traditions are consistently located within more general
comparative perspectives and grounded in basic theoretical and methodological
approaches. My other special concern has been to develop a more applied
approach to political philosophy, especially to problems of political morality. But
this has consistently been done with specific reference to the nature of basic
approaches in moral theory, such as deontology and utilitarianism, and has actually
proved to be in line with a growing interest in applied ethics within analytical
philosophy over the last decade and more. I would have thought that these "special
interests", thus grounded in the core philosophical areas, are entirely compatible
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with the catholic and non-monolithic conception of an analytical philosophy
sensitive to its South African context which Meyerson professes.
When it comes to research and publications, the story is not so different. I
would not be able to say that the major thrust of my own research and publications
has been in the more theoretical reaches of "pure" analytical philosophy, and
certainly a great deal of my efforts have been concerned with applied work on
South African politics and in allied fields such as intellectual history and
democratic theory. But I have never seen this as a separate field of specialisation
different from or unrelated to (analytical) philosophy. On the contrary, I have
consistently sought to bring the methods and resources of philosophy, most
decidedly including those of analytical philosophy, to bear in such research and
applied work. Thus my work in the field of intellectual history has consistently and
consciously sought to ground applied analyses in appropriate theoretical and
philosophical frameworks. For these I have looked, for example, to the work of
Quentin Skinner (Tully 1988), which in turn is based on J.L.Austin's speech act
theory (see, for example, my paper on "Legitimate anachronism as a problem for
intellectual history and philosophy"; du Toit 1991a). Similarly., in my work on the
analysis of ideological discourse I have relied on John Thompson's work on the
theory of ideology (Thompson 1984; du Toit 1994).41 have also had no problem in
venturing repeatedly into more direct explorations of analytical political
philosophy. Thus I have given a number of papers on Rawls and the theory of
justice at philosophical conferences and symposia over the yeais. And if Meyerson
points to the importance of Dworkin for bringing out the logic of rights discourses
in the South African context, then I may be allowed to recall thjtt I devoted a whole
series of papers over a number of years to precisely this topic. L: may be instructive
to compare her comments in this regard with, for example, my chapter in Hugh
Corder's Essays on Law and Social Practice (du Toit 1988b). Similarly my
attempts to apply a Dworkinian analysis of rights in the context of medical ethics is
just the sort of more "concrete" work to which she refers as typical of
contemporary analytical philosophy (Meyerson this volume:8).
hi short, I have for many years been practising in my teaching, research and
publications precisely the sort of approach which Meyerson proposes as in
accordance with her conception of analytical philosophy in the South African
context. If she is serious about the inclusive and relaxed conception of analytical
philosophy she professes in her paper, then she should have no difficulty in
including me in the analytical fold thus conceived. Instead, she casts me as
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essentially a hostile "critic" of analytical philosophy, and an outdated and
uninformed one to boot. On the other hand, if Meyerson, despite her professed
catholic and non-monolithic conception of analytical philosophy and philosophers,
actually subscribes to a more purist conception of analytical philosophy, one that
will have no truck with philosophers who wander from the narrow and beaten
tracks of rigorous analysis and that instinctively consider them a threat, then my
typecasting as "critic" becomes somewhat more intelligible.
For my own part, I hope it will be clear enough from the above that, given my
sustained endeavours as a philosopher over many years, I could not possibly hold
the kind of views Meyerson attributes to me as a "critic" of analytical philosophy
(unless I was the victim of an especially drastic case of intellectual schizophrenia).
Confronted with these attributions, I have no hesitation in disavowing every single
one of them as they stand, and if the position of the "du Toh" in her paper is taken
to be mine, then I reject it as a total and utter misrepresentation.
Yet according to her paper Meyerson apparently wants to make just these
attributions. What is more, she bases her account on a close reading of some of my
publications, and sets out to back up her attributions with chapter and verse. How
is it possible that she could have come to such conclusions regarding the views of
"du Toit" on the basis of my own writings? Something has gone terribly wrong
somewhere. Can it be that I have expressed my own approach and position so
badly and misleadingly that a close reading of them could have brought Meyerson
to construe a "du Toit" which I myself can just not recognise? It will be necessary
to turn to the publications concerned and to consider to what extent they did or
could provide grist to Meyerson's mill. At the same time this will involve
something of a test case for the nature of Meyerson's own philosophical practice,
enabling us to see to what extent this conforms to the relaxed and non-monolithic
conception of analytical philosophy which she professes, or to what extent it
exemplifies a different and narrower operative conception of analytical philosophy.
Four
It would be a long and, no doubt, otiose and boring undertaking to consider
each and every one of Meyerson's attributions to "du Toit" with reference to
the texts concerned. In the present context I do not have the time or space for
this, and I must confine myself to some of the more pertinent cases and to a
few general and background remarks.
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The first point to note is that Meyerson's account is wholly based on an
extremely selective use of a small, incomplete and inadequate body of evidence. In
toto it consists of some fragments from an article on "Philosophy in a changing
plural society" which appeared in the first volume of the South African Journal of
Philosophy in 1982, a few passages from my inaugural lecture of 1988 at UCT
and an unpublished workshop paper of 1987. On this basis she finds it possible to
extrapolate to a generalised account of the position of "du Toit" on a whole range
of issues (and indeed uses that in turn as a stand-in for the critique of analytical
philosophy in South Africa generally). This demonstrates a quite extraordinary
approach to scholarship. No attempt has been made to check generalised
attributions, based on one or other selective passage, against other parts or aspects
of my work, even where this is clearly needed and would havs been quite easy to
do. Take the issue of intellectual history in South Africa as a problem of
(post)colonial thought. The 1982 South African Journal of Philosophy article and
the inaugural lecture provide some passing references and brief discussions of
Stockenstrom etc. These matters have been dealt with much more extensively in
Afrikaner Political Thought (du Toit and Giliomee 1983) and a whole series of
other publications, while my Politikon article (du Toit 1991b) and a recent article
"On ideology" (du Toit 1994) made some attempt to address the underlying issues
at a more theoretical and comparative level. It is a striking feature of Meyerson's
procedure that she makes no attempt at all to bring any of this into her account yet
finds it possible to come to categorical conclusions regarding the positions of the
"critic" concerned on the basis of just those selective passages vitilised.
I suppose that there are various possibilities here. Meyerson may simply not be
aware of any other relevant writings of her "critic" apart from the few texts she
does utilise, a signal failure of research. More likely she simply sees no reason to
consult any further material in the face of the, to her mind, definitive "evidence"
provided by the particular texts she does adduce. If so, this would constitute a very
peculiar principle of interpretation and argument, at variance with some of the
most standard practices of historical, literary or juridical scholarship. Before
condemning this out of hand, we should consider the possibility that it actually
might be in accordance with her own conception of philosophical argument and
analysis, as distinct from historical, literary or other kinds of textually based
interpretation. On this view it would be possible and proper to establish an issue or
discuss someone's position in abstraction from all further textual data or any
relevant contextual considerations by simply focusing on the matter at hand and
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rigorously developing its logical implications. This is indeed an approach
characteristic of analytical philosophy in its narrower and more purist guises,
where "analysis" is essentially a piecemeal procedure, and effectively consists of
mounting arguments and counter-arguments, in abstraction from any more holistic
or contextual perspective. It might help to explain the otherwise inexplicable
failures of elementary scholarship demonstrated in Meyerson's procedure: as an
analytical philosopher she feels entitled to focus exclusively on the views and
arguments entailed by some selected passage only, and to do this in ways that
would be wholly unacceptable to historians, literary critics or, indeed, philosophers
of less purely analytical persuasions. If so, it would also provide a significant
indication whether Meyerson, in her own analytical practice, actually conforms to
the relaxed conception of analytical philosophy which she professes, or reverts to a
narrower and more purist approach.
Secondly it may be noted that Meyerson, in dealing with those few selective
texts which she does discuss in order to establish the position of her "critic",
proceeds with a striking disregard of the general and specific purposes of these
particular writings themselves. It is of some consequence that the two publications
on which she primarily relies to establish the position of her "critic" of analytical
philosophy did not specifically set out to provide any such critique of analytical
philosophy. They were rather concerned with different, though related and
tangential, topics. It may come as something of a surprise to the reader of
Meyerson's paper, but the fact of the matter is that the SAJP article (du Toh 1982)
was not specifically concerned with the "relevance" of analytical philosophy in
particular. That, of course, is Meyerson's topic. Instead, my article dealt with the
more general question of the role and function ofphilosophy in the South African
context. Moreover, it did so at a particular historical conjuncture and with
distinctive objectives in mind. It was originally produced in 1976, written in the
shadow of Soweto and with the impact and challenge of Biko and Black
Consciousness very much in mind. The inaugural lecture (du Toit 1988a) was even
less directly concerned with analytical philosophy or its relevance; instead, it set
out to locate my own concerns as a philosopher in relation to the liberal tradition of
justice and rights in the South African context.5
What Meyerson has done is to read these publications quite single-mindedly as
if they were essentially concerned with her own topic of the "relevance" of
analytical philosophy, and then to extrapolate from this material to some
generalised "critique" of analytical philosophy. This ruthless disregard of the
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specific and stated objectives in the text can, of course, achieve startling results of
interpretation. Thus in the SAJP article I set out, writing very much as a South
African philosopher, to provide a general se^critique of the nature and role of
philosophy in the South African context. Li the course of this general account
various illustrations from, and passing comments on, analytical philosophy also
figured. On Meyerson's version, that is by disregarding the functional context and
by focusing on her selected aspects only, these passing comnnaits and illustrations
are construed as a hostile attack on analytical philosophy, thus giving an entirely
different meaning to the text. For present purposes, though, it is the operative
conception of analytical philosophy in Meyerson's own account which is
instructive. On the basis of the relaxed and inclusive conception of analytical
philosophy which she professes, she should have little difficulty in accepting the
position articulated in this SAJP article as entirely compatible with her own
professed concerns as an analytical philosopher. Instead, she rejects this as a
hostile attack against which analytical philosophy has to be defended. Once again,
this strongly points to the conclusion that Meyerson's operative conception of
analytical philosophy is in effect much more narrow than tliat professed in her
paper.
Any conclusions regarding the precise nature of Meyerson's operative
conception of analytical philosophy must, of course, depend on a more detailed
consideration of her critical procedures. After all, it remains possible that, though
the publications she adduces did not directly address Meyersco's particular topic,
they nevertheless provide sufficient evidence for her account of this "critic" of
analytical philosophy. Consider this evidence, and Meyerson's use of it. Her most
important source is the opening section of the 1982 SAJP paper which deals with
the self-conceptions of their social and political responsibilities prevalent among
contemporary philosophers. The article is concerned with such philosophical self-
conceptions in general, but refers specifically to philosophers who are "more or
less analytically trained or even somewhat influenced by the heritage of Logical
Positivism" (du Toit 1982:156). As illustrations of one such conception in
particular, the paper refers to a well-known statement by Weldon from 1956 and a
more incidental remark of Quine's in 1964. Meyerson quite rightly points out that
this does not provide an adequate basis for generalisations regarding analytical
philosophy as such, since these illustrations are taken from an earlier stage of
analytical philosophy and the views concerned have in various ways become dated.
This is quite correct - and was expressly so noted in the paper concerned.
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Immediately following the illustrations from Weldon and Quine, the following quite
explicit qualification is made:
Obviously this sketch is an oversimplification even with regard merely to the world
of Analytical and Positivist philosophy. The philosophical assumptions underlying
these views are, in current philosophical debate, increasingly subject to revision and
criticism (du Toit 1982:157).
This is clear enough, and should surely serve to reassure Meyerson on this
particular score. However, her account of "du Toit" based on this paper insists
on the opposite, i.e. that these particular illustrations should be read as
implying a generalised attack on analytical philosophy as such and in general.
Did she then perhaps not notice the crucial qualification to the contrary? No,
as a matter of fact she is actually well aware of it, and explicitly refers to "du
Toit's...concession, at one point, that his description of the analytic
commitment is simplistic" (Meyerson this volume: 12). She even proceeds to
quote the passage cited above, but only to dismiss this "concession" out of
hand, essentially on the grounds that it does not fit the account of "du Toit"
constructed in her paper (Meyerson this volume: 12). This is circular reasoning
with a vengeance indeed.
However, if Meyerson's handling of her evidence is transparently circular, it
should not simply be dismissed for that reason. It is important to note quite
carefully what is at stake here, since it reflects on Meyerson's own understanding
of relevant changes in the nature and practice of analytical philosophy itself. The
precise point at issue is that Meyerson first alleges that the SAJP article uses the
dated positions of logical positivism and Weldon in order to come to generalised
conclusions about analytical philosophy as such. When the text explicitly
repudiates any such generalisations, she finds it "obscure" and "hard to know what
to make of this argument" (Meyerson this volume: 12) Why? Because it is said to
be at variance with the generalised "conclusion" regarding analytical philosophy
supposed to be based on the original illustrations. But this is precisely the issue at
stake: there was no generalised argument regarding the nature of analytical
philosophy involved in the use of the particular illustrations drawn from logical
positivism and Weldon. The point is perfectly clear, and not at all hard to
understand - unless, of course, one is operating with the assumption that any
reference to analytical philosophy must involve implicit generalisations regarding
its nature and, furthermore, that the correct view of this is to be found in some
narrow and purist conception. There is no difficulty at all in referring to the self-
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conceptions of certain early analytical philosophers, and then to go on to wam that
these should not be generalised to analytical philosophy as such, since later
analytical philosophers have developed other views on these matters. This is the
position taken in the SAJP article, and it is a perfectly clear and coherent position
as long as one is operating with a relaxed and contingent conception of analytical
philosophy. However, if your operative conception of analyticeJ philosophy is more
narrowly drawn, and if you assume a more purist conception which does not allow
for significant changes in the nature and practice of analytical philosophy itself,
then references to early analytical philosophers must be consistent with whatever
later developments are recognised. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that
Meyerson's problems in making sense of this "concession" in the SAJP article are
precisely due to such a narrow operative conception of the nature of analytical
philosophy.6
The implicit shifts between Meyerson's professed inclusive and relaxed
conception of analytical philosophy and her operative narrower and purist
assumptions regarding it, if that is what they are, can also help to account for other
striking features of her account of "du Toit" as the purported "critic" of analytical
philosophy. Thus in the same context Meyerson is particularly concerned to stress
the outdated nature of "du Toit's views" of analytical philosophy, more especially
with regard to the logical positivist assumption of a sharp divide between
conceptual investigation and empirical knowledge. She refers to this as "a startling
distortion of the history of twentieth century Anglo-Amsrican philosophy"
(Meyerson this volume: 13). Citing the well-known work of Rawls and Dworkin,
Meyerson finds it necessary to comment that
when even non-practitioners see the significance of the work of someone like
Dworkin, as demonstrated by the feature article on his work in Time magazinc.it is
hard to understand how philosophers could come to say that contemporary analytical
philosophy is reluctant to deal with social and political issues...These facts confirm
just how outdated is du Toit's...version of analytical philosophy (Meyerson this
volume: 17-18).
In particular she feels called on to argue against the philosophical assumption
that there is a sharp divide between conceptual investigation and empirical
knowledge, a position which "du Toit" still outdatedly ascribes to analytical
philosophy and apparently is also committed to himself (Meyerson this
volume:13). Now Meyerson may be excused if she is unaware of the fact that
this particular set of issues and developments were very much at the heart of
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my own teaching and research at the time, for example in the senior course I
taught on "Analytical Social and Political Philosophy" at Stellenbosch. So far
from being "outdated" this course probably constituted the most extensive
treatment of these particular developments offered by any Philosophy
department in South Africa at that stage. However, even if her account is
based on the SAJP article only, it could hardly have escaped her notice that it
contains the following relevant passage:
The philosophical assumptions underlying these views are, in current philosophical
debate, increasingly subject to revision and criticism. Quine himself would reject
such a sharp dichotomy between empirical science and philosophical analysis, and it
is well-known that the whole series of fundamental dichotomies such as the
distinction between facts and values, first order language use and meta-analysis,
observation sentences and theory construction, etc. have more and more come in for
review and qualification. A new generation of younger philosophers, influenced by
the later Wittgenstein and Winch, have set out to show that, properly understood,
philosophical analyses of linguistic usage might have profound implications for
philosophy and social theory (du Toit 1982:156).
The passage is relatively brief, and it was not further developed in the context
of that article, but it is there and anyone specifically interested in this aspect
could hardly fail to notice it. Indeed, Meyerson did notice this passage, and
actually quotes it in full. So how can she ascribe actual ignorance of these
later developments in analytical philosophy to her "critic" if they are explicitly
referred to in the very article that she adduces as evidence? And how can she
claim that this "critic" attributes such positions to analytical philosophy in
general when she well knows that the inaccuracy of any such generalisation is
explicitly acknowledged in the article in question? Well, the only answer we
get is that "it is hard to know what to make" of the passage in question
(Meyerson this volume: 12). I am sorry, but it is not hard to understand what to
make of these matters at all. Either this "critic" of analytical philosophy was
ignorant of the relevant later developments, or he was not. And either he
attributed the positivist disjunction between conceptual meaning and
knowledge of empirical reality to analytical philosophers generally, or he did
not. And on this the evidence in the article in question is quite clear for all to
verify, and it does not support Meyerson's contentions. If this evidence is in
conflict with the "conclusions" regarding analytical philosophy she attributes
to her purported "critic", then she cannot just dismiss that evidence but will
rather have to reconsider her own attribution of the alleged "conclusions" -
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unless of course the position of the purported "critic" is not a matter of
evidence but an a priori construction driven by her own operative conception
of the nature of analytical philosophy.
Many more examples might be given of the peculiar and forced constructions
Meyerson imposes on the evidence in the course of her defence of analytical
philosophy against such uninformed and hostile "critics" as the "du Toit" she has
constructed for this purpose. Thus in the conclusion of the SAJP article we find the
following passage:
In the plural society of South Africa we may, in philosophy as well, no longer proceed
ethnocentrically from an assumed unity of rationality in all processes of social
consciousness. Rationality is not a direct gift from heaven, but it is a human cultural
creation and hence can take different modifications (du Toit 1982:161).
hi the original paper, of which her article is a revised version, Meyerson cited
this and correctly observed that it raised the question of cultural relativism as
a basic philosophical issue (Meyerson 1995:13-14). hi this paper she went on
to align the commitment to the unity of rationality with analytical philosophy,
and suggested that the alternative position of cultural relativism must be based
on "post-modernism" (Meyerson 1995:13). The clear suggestion was that "du
Toit", as a "critic" of analytical philosophy, must be deriving his argument on
the non-unity of rationality from post-modernist theory. As it happens, though,
the passage concerned is virtually a direct quote from Winch's Idea of Social
Science which, as is well-known, is explicitly based on the work of the later
Wittgenstein, one of the dominant figures in the development of analytical
philosophy beyond its earlier logical poskivist stage. The reference to Winch is
clearly given in a footnote, which also provides a further reference to the
volume on Rationality edited by Bryan Wilson, a standard work on this topic
bringing together a number of seminal papers mainly by analytical
philosophers (Wilson 1970). In other words, the passage in the SAJP article
which Meyerson took pains to construe in terms of an alien deconstructionist
critique of analytical philosophy is in fact quite clearly part and parcel of an
internal debate within analytical philosophy itself. The point is that though
there certainly might be room for disagreement and for philosophical debate on
the unity of rationality and the implications for cultural relativism, there is no
reason whatsoever to turn this into a confrontation between analytical
philosophy and its "critics", as Meyerson for some strange reason insisted on
doing.
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In the revised version of the current article Meyerson now concedes at least
some of this. She admits that cultural relativism is not a post-modernist monopoly,
but that mis position is shared "even by some analytical philosophers" (Meyerson
this volume: 19). And she concedes that "this view does not represent an attack on
analytical philosophy as such, which is why even analytical philosophers have been
able to advance it" (Meyerson this volume: 19). At first sight this might appear to
be some sort of improvement, but on closer inspection it becomes clear mat she has
only compounded the confusion. Whereas her earlier position had the relevant facts
all wrong, it did have a certain obstinate logic in ranging "du Toit" as a hostile and
uninformed "critic" of analytical philosophy along with post-modem cultural
relativists: on her account they shared a common opposition to that commitment to
the unity of rationality supposed to be crucial to analytical philosophy. In the
revised version, however, it is no longer clear what she is arguing either about "du
Toit" as "critic", or about the commitments of analytical philosophy on this issue.
As far as "du Toit" is concerned she now claims that "it is possible" that he holds a
view, shared "even by some analytical philosophers", which might imply that
analytical philosophy is a Eurocentric method (Meyerson this volume: 19).
However, this rather desperate scramble to square her argument with the admitted
facts will not do. What, for instance, has happened to the uninformed and outdated
nature of "du Toit" as "critic", if it now turns out that his views are shared "even
by some analytical philosophers"? And what about those few heterodox analytical
philosophers who hold these particular views - can they really be considered bona
fide analytical philosophers? Well, actually no, it would seem. For in the very same
sentence in which Meyerson concedes that "even some" analytical philosophers
hold relativist views regarding rationality, she aligns this view with the alleged
Eurocentricity of "the method so prized by analytical philosophers" (Meyerson this
volume: 19). One can only conclude that the dissident analytical philosophers
concerned do not prize that method in the same sense, and mat they are not to be
taken seriously when it comes to circumscribing the compass of analytical
philosophy in general. Conversely, it is clear that the analytical philosophers who
prize the unity and universality of rationality, and who will have no truck with
arguments which could lead to cultural relativism, provide the real point of
reference for mis particular discussion. Li short, what we have here is the same
sleight of hand in shifting from a professed relaxed and inclusive conception of
analytical philosophy to a narrower and more purist operative conception of
analytical philosophy when it really counts.
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One further example of the forced interpretations needed by Meyerson in order
to arrive at her construction of "du Toit" as "critic" of analytical philosophy should
suffice. In her original paper Meyerson made repeated use of a particular passage
in the SAJP article to substantiate her claim that, according to "du Toit", analytical
philosophers in general "see their brief in the thinnest possible way, as the
elucidation of the 'logic' of this or that 'language game'" (Meyerson 1995:6). The
passage in question is concerned with the relation that philosophy might have in the
South African context to a social and political movement such as Black
Consciousness, and reads as follows:
Indeed, philosophy as an academic discipline, as it is understood and professionally
practised today by most philosophers in South Africa as well, can have little or
nothing to do with a social and political movement such as Black Consciousness.
Perhaps it might occasion an academic paper or two analysing the 'logic' of the
particular political and ideological 'language game', or perhaps someone might
attempt a more systematic analysis of the leading concepts in the Black
Consciousness literature (du Toit 1982:159).
Two things should be noted here. First, the passage is quite evidently not
concerned with a critique of analytical philosophy in particular, but with the
condition of philosophy in general in the South African context. The critical
charge, such as it is, is not directed to analytical philosophy in particular, but
applies to South African philosophers in general - since I was writing as a
South African philosopher myself this was also clearly meant as an exercise in
se/^critique, and not as an external critique from one philosophical vantage
point directed at a rival philosophical position. Secondly, it should be noted
that the passage amounts to a highly particular and contextualised judgement
concerning the likely responses of South African philosophers to a
phenomenon like Black Consciousness. It does not by any means amount to a
programmatic argument whether (analytical) philosophy may, or may not, in
theory be capable of any such applications. This is the way in which Meyerson
insisted on taking this passage in her original paper but there seems to be no
reason to do this - unless, of course, one first identifies philosophy tout court
with analytical philosophy in particular, and secondly equates the
programmatic prospects of analytical philosophy itself with the actual
performance of South African philosophers.7 In short, Meyerson's use of this
passage in her original paper had very little to do with its actual meaning and
thrust in context; it had to be forced into a quite different set of arguments in
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order to arrive at her account of "du Toit" as the "critic" of analytical
philosophy.
In the revised version of her article Meyerson has dropped all specific
references to this discussion of the challenges posed by a phenomenon like Black
Consciousness to South African philosophers including the analytical philosophers
among them. Indeed, from her account the reader now would not know mat the
challenge of Black Consciousness constituted a central theme of the 1982 SAJP
article. At the same time she has retained all the main contentions regarding the
position of "du Toit" which had been built on this particular set of "evidence". The
only difference is that she has now been careful to insert other verbatim quotes
from the SAJP article to provide ostensible backing for the same contentions. One
must marvel at the impervious self-confidence of this procedure: if one piece of
"evidence" for your conclusions will not do, well then simply find some other
"evidence" as premises for the same conclusions.* This amounts to exactly the
converse of what Meyerson elsewhere terms the "guiding demand" in whose
service all analytical writing is supposed to operate, i.e. the Socratic principle 'to
follow the argument where it leads" (Meyerson this volume: 16). Meyerson's own
procedure appears rather to conform conversely to what Bertrand Russell once
termed the guiding demand of Scholastic reasoning, i.e. to fix on a set conclusion
and then to find whatever grounds will serve to provide some sort of support for
that.
In the mean time I may perhaps be permitted to wonder what became of the
challenge of Black Consciousness to (analytical) philosophy in the South African
context. For the purposes of my 1982 SAJP article this was an absolutely central
concern. But on this Meyerson now maintains a total silence, while of course
continuing to insist that analytical philosophy is potentially of great relevance in
this very context. What are we to make of Meyerson's calculated silence on this
front? Unlike Meyerson's benighted "critics", hardly anyone would want to dispute
that analytical philosophy can potentially be of considerable relevance in all sorts
of ways. To my mind, though, the concrete and contextualised question regarding
the track record and imminent prospects of (analytical) philosophy in responding to
particular challenges in the South African context is a much more interesting, and
indeed urgent, question. Should we take Meyerson's silence on this issue to mean
that she does not recognise this as an appropriate question in relation to her case
for analytical philosophy? Or should we take it to mean that she does recognise this
challenge, but implicitly concedes that a case cannot be made for analytical
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philosophy in such contextualised terms and with reference to the actual track
record of analytical philosophy and its imminent prospects in the South African
context? The answers to these concrete and contextualised questions would be
much more revealing regarding the "relevance" of analytical philosophy on
Meyerson's account than any number of misconceptions she might document
regarding such misguided "critics" as "du Toit".
Five
A substantial part of Meyerson's article is given to a defence of the relevance
of analytical philosophy to the South African context against charges from
"critics" such as "du Toit" that it cannot have such relevance due to its
universalist and ahistorical nature, and because it would involve the
inappropriate application of "extraneous intellectual resources" in local
contexts. To a considerable extent this discussion turns on the finer details of
my treatment of Simkins and Rawls in my inaugural lecture. I have some
difficulty in knowing how best to respond to this in the present context. On the
one hand Meyerson's discussion of these matters raises a number of issues of
genuine importance which have been central to much of my own work. The
particular critical points she makes regarding my own accounts of Simkins
and Rawls also merit a detailed and extensive response. If the space was
available I would very much like to take her various substantive and critical
points up on precisely these matters. However, the difficulty is that she is not
primarily interested in Simkins or Rawls, or in my accounts of them, for their
own sake. Rather, in her article all of this is in the service of a larger
argumentative strategy, i.e. to rebut the unfounded charges levelled by the
"critics" of analytical philosophy. It is for this purpose that "du Toit" once
again figures so prominently on her pages. But it is less clear for precisely
which general charges regarding the relevance of analytical philosophy in the
South African context this "critic" is supposed to take responsibility on
account of his treatment of Simkins and Rawls.
In her original paper a number of quite specific charges were levelled against
"du Toit" in this regard. Thus it was alleged that "du Toit" holds such views as
that, in the South African context, philosophers should not make any use of
"extraneous intellectual resources" (Meyerson 1995:2,17,21 etc.), that
philosophers in South Africa should confine themselves in their teaching and
research to issues of local interest (Meyerson 1995:16-17), that the traditional
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curricula and research projects of analytical philosophy are out of place in South
Africa (Meyerson 1995:16), and that political philosophy should be treated as a
specialization without grounding in the core areas of mainstream philosophy
(Meyerson 1995:22). By and large this was based on my criticisms of Charles
Simkins' invocation of Rawls in the course of my inaugural lecture. In effect it
amounted to an easily verifiable misrepresentation of my views on the basis of a
total misreading of the specific purpose of my concern with Simkins' particular
project of "reconstructing the liberal tradition" in South Africa, an enterprise by no
means to be confused with mainstream theorising in philosophy or even in political
philosophy. In the revised version of her article Meyerson has now dropped or
substantially qualified all the specific attributions to "du Toit" noted above. She
has also more correctly characterised my critical concerns with Simkins to be "in
respect of work which attempts to reconstruct a particular local political tradition"
(Meyerson this volume:22). As far as they go, these retractions are welcome and
should help to clear the ground for more pertinent discussion. The problem
remains, however, that if the more specific charges have been dropped, the overall
argument somehow remains in place. The article still contains an extended
discussion of my treatments of Simkins and Rawls which, apart from the more
detailed points of specialist interest, somehow are still supposed to serve as a
rebuttal of the unfounded views of this "critic" of analytical philosophy and its
relevance in the South African context, even if it is no longer clear just what those
views are supposed to be or just how they derive from my treatments of Simkins
and Rawls.
I am afraid that this kind of discussion cannot serve any useful purpose. As a
polemical strategy it is essentially unfair, and in general it merely serves to make
confusion worse confounded. I will be more than happy to debate an accurate
representation of my own views on the relevance of analytical philosophy in the
South African context; I welcome any opportunity to discuss the problems of
intellectual history and political traditions in a (post)colonial context such as that of
South Africa; I am quite prepared to consider a detailed critique of my treatments
of Simkins, including his invocation of Rawls and my own criticisms of that. But
for the sake of intellectual order, let us please deal with each of these in its own
right and proper context. The mixture concocted by Meyerson, in which a technical
and detailed discussion of Rawls and Simkins serves as a stalking horse for vague
and unspecified allusions regarding different matters in other contexts, is too heady
a brew by far.
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In the present context I will confine myself to a few general remarks in response
to Meyerson's evident confusion regarding my own views on the peculiar problems
of intellectual history and political traditions in a (post)colonial context. According
to Meyerson "du Toit" is committed to some Utopian version of autochthonous
philosophising in South Africa to the extent that she points to the "contradictions"
involved in his own use of "extraneous intellectual resources". Thus she considers
it a "puzzling feature" of "du Toit's" account that much is made of local figures
like Stockenstrdm etc. "when they were not, after all, building on the work of local
thinkers but importing the idea of the rule of law from Britain" (Meyerson this
volume:23). This amounts to a basic and double misunderstanding of the problems
posed by a (post)colonial context for philosophy and local intellectual traditions as
well as of the main thrust of my own work in this regard. The key feature of
colonial intellectual history is precisely that in many different ways local traditions
are not primarily the product of internal social and political processes only. The
colonial encounter precisely brings drastically divergent cultures together, and
colonial history is marked by a series of extraneous interventions at both political
and intellectual levels. The very idea that there can be something like a purely local
or autochthonous intellectual tradition in a (post)colonial contact is a contradiction
in terms. My own work has been much concerned with just these features of
intellectual history in South Africa. At the substantive level this has meant, from
Afrikaner Political Thought on, a charting of the various ways in which local
traditions are conceived and generated in and through an ongoing reception,
transformation and perversion of, as well as interaction with, extraneous
intellectual impulses and resources. At a more theoretical level I have reflected on
some of the issues concerned in my Politikon article (du Toit 1991b). Taking my
cue from, for example, Louis Hartz's fragmentation theory or Hobsbawm and
Ranger's notion of "invented traditions", and more latterly from theories of
"othering discourses" and the ComarofFs notion of a "colonisation of the mind", I
have attempted to come to terms with the peculiarities of intellectual history in
(post)colonial contexts. I think it is entirely appropriate that in doing so the
theoretical approach adopted, as much as the subject matter itself, should be the
product of a thorough mixing of both extraneous and local intellectual resources.
This has also been a conscious striving in my theoretical work, and of applied
interpretations in other contexts as well. I have consistently been an opponent of the
prevailing tendency to South African "exceptionalism" in local political analysis
and discussion. Thus, in the last few years, I have been active in introducing the
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comparative literature on transitions from authoritarian rule (O'Donnell and
Schmitters etc.) to the analysis of the South African transition from apartheid.
Similarly, I have been specifically concerned to locate the current South African
debate on the proposed "Truth Commission" in relation to the international
learning experience in Latin America and Eastern Europe in this regard. To my
mind, there can be no question that any or all of this utilisation of "extraneous
intellectual resources" might somehow be in tension with a concern with "local
issues". Precisely in a (post)colonial context it is a radically raise and misleading
construction to pose these as mutually exclusive polarities, as Meyerson does via
her extrapolation of "du Toit".9
Six
I have by no means responded to all of Meyerson's strictures on "du Toit" as
"critic" of analytical philosophy, including some to which her paper gives
most attention. However, her remaining polemical targets may be said to fall
into two main categories:
1) There are certain detailed critical discussions of passages like those on
Chomsky and Quine in the 1982 South African Journal of Philosophy article
demonstrating how they are supposed to have been misquoted or taken out of
context. However, even if Meyerson should be wholly right on my alleged errors of
interpretation regarding Chomsky etc., it would make no difference on the main
issues considered above. Meyerson believes that I base large generalisations
concerning analytical philosophy as such on these particular illustrations, in which
case it would of course matter a great deal, at least for the purposes of her
argument, that they are representative of analytical philosophy and that I get them
right. But since I was not concerned to construct a generalised critique of analytical
philosophy at all, and certainly not on the basis of these particular illustrations, this
relevance falls away. I do believe that in these cases my interpretations can be
defended, but this would involve extensive and complicated exercises in exegesis -
and I cannot see how this would make any difference to the overall argument. For
these reasons I am leaving these cases unanswered even if I do not agree with
Meyerson's specific contentions in this regard.
2) There are also some more substantive discussions on central issues in
current political philosophy, such as the nature of Rawls' "ideal theory" and the
implications of this for possible applications of his theory of justice to radically
unjust societies, or the correct interpretation of liberal "neutrality"- These are
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genuinely important issues, and well worth discussing in their own right. Again I
believe that my own published positions on these issues sire defensible, while
Meyerson misrepresents both certain aspects of Rawls' theory and even more so
my own alleged position on Rawls. Thus there is no reason to conclude, as
Meyerson does, that I would make such an elementary error as to think that "there
are some actually existing societies" to which Rawls' ideal theory apply while
being irrelevant to other societies (Meyerson this volume:24). Similarly Rawls'
notion of ideal theory in relation to basically just societies as distinct from radically
unjust societies, like apartheid South Africa, is considerably more complex than
appears from her account (Rawls 1972). But there is certainly space for alternative
views and counter-arguments on these matters, and Letter has made a good start in
his recent Justice for an Unjust Society (Letter 1993). Likewise, the issue of the
meaning of liberal "neutrality" is a much more contested one than Meyerson will
allow: liberal theorists like Rawls, Dworkin, Nagel and Ackerman have each
developed subtly or more distinctively different positions in this regard. And it is
still another matter again how all of this would apply to the kinds of questions
regarding analytical philosophy which Meyerson wishes to address. This is really
where the proper discussion with Meyerson should commence - the more is the pity
that she has let so much unnecessary polemic get in the way that we will have to
leave that debate to another occasion if we are to do it justice.
I have also not responded to the non-polemical sections of Meyerson's article in
which she introduces relevant perspectives on some of the issues at stake via
analogies with feminist arguments etc. There is much of interest in these parts of
her article, but these cannot be pursued in the present context. I will thus simply
conclude by briefly indicating where I think the real issues between myself and
Meyerson lie, once all the straw men cluttering the landscape have been cleared out
of the way.
Seven
It should be clear by now that Meyerson's beleaguered defences of analytical
philosophy against its South African "critics" are quite unnecessary and
fundamentally misconceived. She may rest assured that the catholic and non-
monolithic kind of analytical philosophy espoused by her in this paper will, if
genuine, find few, if any, real critics. Others, like myself, will be only too
willing to join with her in thinking through how (analytical) philosophy could
be made more "relevant" in the South African context. Even then, though,
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there should be room for critical discussions of the role and assumptions of
philosophy and philosophers in South Africa, not excluding analytical
philosophy and analytical philosophers. Meyerson and myself may well find
ourselves on different sides of various critical issues in this regard. However,
if critical discussions and possibly even polemical exchanges are to generate
light rather than heat and confusion, some basic distinctions will have to be
borne in mind.
Firstly, there is a fundamental difference between external and internal
(selfjcriticism. While the former proceeds from divergent assumptions and
may have essentially negative aims, the latter actually assumes common
ground and may have constructive aims in terms of shared values and criteria.
When internal critics are cast as necessarily external and hostile this can lead
to serious problems of communication.
Secondly, there is a fundamental difference between a programmatic critique
(or defence) of a philosophical approach and particular contextualised judgements
of its practitioners. It is one thing to enter in discussion on the potential prospects
for and/or limitations of analytical philosophy in general; it is another thing to
make a critical assessment of the actual performance and prospects of (analytical)
philosophers in a particular setting. It is entirely possible that, while in
programmatic terms analytical philosophy could be argued to have great potential
relevance in the South African context, the actual state of analytical philosophy in
South Africa might still leave a great deal to be desired. And it would not be
adequate to respond to criticism on the latter front merely by shifting the ground to
programmatic discussions.
Thirdly, if we are to engage in comparative and critical discussions of different
philosophical approaches, then it will be necessary to retain a proper sense of the
distinctiveness of each, i.e. their specific contributions and limitations, even while
remaining open to the extent to which they might share common philosophical
ground. There are ways in which analytical philosophy, compared to other
philosophical approaches, is specifically limited as well as distinctively rigorous. A
defence of analytical philosophy which merely insists on the ways in which it is
part of the philosophical mainstream, and which does not face up to its distinctive
limitations, may actually amount to a disguised form of philosophical
imperialism.10
Bearing in mind these distinctions, it may be possible to identify where the
actual quarrel, if any, between myself and Meyerson lies, or in what sense it may
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be necessary for her to defend analytical philosophy against me and others as
internal or external critics.
At the outset I said that I found the catholic and non-monolithic conception of
analytical philosophy which Meyerson professes attractive and that I welcomed the
basic thrust of her concern that this could be shown to be "relcjvant" to local issues
in the South African context (even if the notion of "relevancy" needed to be further
unpacked). I do think that there is more common ground between us than major
philosophical differences, if she can only let go of her polemical obsessions with
"du Toit" and the "critics" of analytical philosophy. But there also appear to be
genuine philosophical differences involved, and these should at least be identified
here for possible future discussion.
One set of possibly contentious issues concerns the way in which the nature of
the South African intellectual context is conceptualised in relation to the
mainstream Western tradition of philosophy. Meyerson claims that
analytical philosophy has, at its best, enormous power to illuminate and impact on
our local situation (Meyerson this volume: 1).
But just what is the relevant meaning and implications of "local" in this
context? I would argue that, fully unpacked, the meaning and implications of
"local" would require us to reflect on the (post-)colonial, as opposed to the
provincial, nature of South African intellectual traditions. It is not clear
whether Meyerson recognises what is involved in this distinction when she
writes that
the fact is that all South African social theorists and philosophers, of whatever
persuasion, are working in the same context and face the same problem: we depend
inevitably on overseas work and we need to be sensitive to the problems created by
that (Meyerson this volume:28).
A great deal will depend on the precise burden of the adjective "overseas" in
this sentence (i.e. whether or not it is taken to imply a colonial condition and
history). Is the position of South African philosophers essentially similar to
those of their colleagues in, say, the English or French provinces, or perhaps
in Oklahoma, or is there an important and relevant difference between their
respective intellectual situations in relation to the metropolitan mainstream?11
My suspicion is that Meyerson assumes that "local" is to be taken in the
provincial rather than the (post-)colonial sense. This has important
philosophical implications and has everything to do with Meyerson's
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discussion of the Eurocentric assumption of the unity of rationality and the
dangers inherent in cultural relativism (Meyerson this volume:22f). Here there
certainly are ample grounds for philosophical debate, and I suspect that
Meyerson will not easily be persuaded by my analysis of the implications of a
(post-)colonial intellectual history for the practice of philosophy itself. But this
is by no means to be confused with a critique or a defence of analytical
philosophy - as indicated above the issue of the unity of rationality is also very
much an internal philosophical dispute within analytical philosophy itself.
Likewise I think that this set of issues is also relevant to Meyerson's
alternative exegesis to my own of Rawls on "ideal theory" and liberal
"neutrality". At one level her critical comments on my own accounts in this
regard require a standard exegetical response: we will have to go back to the
details of Rawls' texts and thrash out how his arguments are best to be
construed. At another level, though, the specific issues concerned here have a
direct bearing on the problem of making philosophy "relevant" to the South
African context. In this regard, I have already referred to the suggestive study
by Hennie Letter, Justice for an Unjust Society (Lotter 1993), in which he has
taken on precisely these issues.
The second set of genuinely contested issues concerns the precise relation of
philosophy to social and political practice. Meyerson wants to argue that
(analytical) philosophy "has, at its best, enormous power to illuminate and impact
on our local situation" (Meyerson this volume: 1, emphasis added; note that the
emphasised words here amount to a much stronger claim than would be involved in
"illumination" only). Meyerson not only maintains that (analytical) philosophy can
and should provide accessible analyses of local and concrete issues. She also wants
to argue that it has "enormous potential to alter substantive beliefs" (Meyerson this
volume: 14), and that it may legitimately be expected to "contribute positively to
social transformation" (Meyerson, this volume:9, emphasis added). These are
large and general claims which need to be unpacked, and it is unclear just how far
Meyerson would be prepared to go along with some possible implications. Thus by
way of example of what she has in mind, Meyerson refers to the impact of a
rigorous analysis of the conceptual logic of rights discourses on those who tend to
endorse notions of "rights" naively and uncritically:
This shows how the elucidation of meanings may have important political
implicatioas...when the notion [of "rights"] is elucidated those who merely mouthed
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position" (Meyerson this vohime:17, emphasis added).
Two comments are in order here. First, this seems to assume an excessively
rationalist view of the relation between thought and social or political
conduct.12 Secondly, it needs to be pointed out that changes in political views
and attitudes, or in substantive beliefs, even where these do take place, are still
a considerable way short of what is commonly understood by social
transformation. I am afraid that Meyerson tends to use the word
"transformative" rather loosely. She asks "how could it be other than
transformative to engage in an activity [of critical analysis]" (Meyerson this
volume: 16), and claims that she could give "innumerable examples of
analytical work with transformative political and social significance"
(Meyerson this volume: 17). However, the examples provided stay strictly
within the academic realm and at best concern the implications of theoretical
analysis for applied ethics. What is missing here is any strong sense for the
problems involved in what used to be called the relation between theory and
practice. (Bernard Williams and Mary Wamock chairing national
commissions does not necessarily indicate that a satisfactory solution to this
basic problem has been found). It would seem that this might also be part of
the explanation for Meyerson's inability to comprehend the sense in which I
am prepared to "concede" that the account of (analytical) philosophy in my
1982 SAJP article is an oversimplification, but nevertheless continue to
maintain that later and more sophisticated versions of analytical philosophy
share similar philosophical self-conceptions. Though readily conceding that
"philosophical analyses of linguistic usage might have profound implications
for political philosophy and social theory", I wrote, '*the decisive question
remains whether philosophy has any consequences for social and political
practice" (du Toit 1982:157, emphasis added). The decisive question, in other
words, concerns the relation of theory to practice. I argued that, even if one
took into account the later developments in analytical philosophy which closed
the assumed gap between conceptual meaning and substantive empirical
knowledge, the self-conception of the philosophers concerned essentially
remained that of philosophy as an analytical and theoretical activity. In this
respect there are crucial differences between analytical philosophers and the
Hegelian and Marxist traditions in philosophy. If one has an attenuated sense
of what the question of social and political practice involves, or if one tends to
equate the logical "implications" of theoretical analyses and conceptual
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investigations with their social and political "consequences", then the point of
my argument here will probably remain elusive. This is not necessarily a
question of individual obfuscation. There may be genuine philosophical
differences involved, and it is an interesting question to what extent the
problem of theory and practice can even be raised within certain rationalist
traditions of philosophy. This is the point where my argument for a more
Hegelian approach to the relation between philosophy and social and political
consciousness would begin, and it may be the point where Meyerson as
analytical philosopher comes to the limits of her philosophical tolerance.
So we do have genuine issues to debate, and there may be underlying
philosophical disagreements to confront - but please, let us first get rid of
fabricated polemics against "du Toit" and other supposed "critics" of analytical
philosophy. Who needs them, anyway?
Notes
1
 One sometimes gets the impression that there is more active interest and debate
on current philosophical developments outside philosophy departments. In this regard is
instructive that Theoria, currently the best journal of philosophy and social theory in
South Africa, is not published from a Philosophy department
2
 Denise Meyerson, "Analytical philosophy and its South African critics",
Social Dynamics 21(1) (1995):57-87.
3
 Similarly, in the UCT Politics department, I currently teach a survey course on
theories and critics of human rights, ranging from Hobbes, Locke and Bentham through
Marx to Rawls, Dworkin and Nozick as a core course in the political philosophy Honours
programme.
4
 Thompson is not a "pure" analytical philosopher, but the kind of Cambridge
philosopher engaging with Continental theory which Meyerson's catholic and non-
monolithic view of analytical philosophy would surely welcome.
5
 The unpublished workshop paper - du Toit, 1987 - actually did set out to say
some sharply critical things involving the practice of analytical philosophy in South
Africa. However, this critique very specifically concerned issues connected with the
objectives, practice and promotion of the journal Philosophical Papers at that time, and
was not generalised to analytical philosophy as such.
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6
 I will return in the concluding section to another way in which Meyerson's
apparent inability to grasp what is at stake here may be due to certain inherent
limitations of analytical philosophy itself, more specifically with regard to the
problem of theory and practice.
7
 In the latter case it would presumably be highly relevant to inquire whether
my judgement at the time held true: how did (analytical) philosophers in South
Africa respond to the phenomenon of Black Consciousness? Almost twenty years on
I am not aware, apart from this South African Journal of Philosophy article itself
and a recent piece by Hennie Lotter, of substantial philosophical responses on this
front.
8
 As a matter of fact the new quotations arc taken from the same discussion of
illustrations drawn from earlier analytical philosophers which have already been dealt
with above, and are once more used out of context to support purported generalisations
regarding analytical philosophy as such which a closer examination will simply not bear
out.
9
 Note, once more, how this construction proceeds: in her account of my position
on this topic Meyerson is quite ready to extrapolate from the occasional remark on
Stockenström, and sees no need to consult the more systematic discussions even where
these are directly relevant and easily available.
10
 The assertion that analytical philosophy is merely the continuation in the
twentieth century of the classical mainstream tradition which goes back to the Greeks
could then be taken to imply, conversely, that non-analytical philosophy does not belong
to that mainstream.
11
 When General Smuts famously referred to South Africa as "this far-flung
corner of the world" he essentially conceptualised the South African situation in
provincial terms, denying its (post-)colonial condition.
12
 Meyerson refers to "deeply buried assumptions [which] feed into action,
and if they do not survive scrutiny neither will the patterns of behaviour which they
inform" (Meyerson this volume:72, emphasis added). Both psycho-analysts, on the
one hand, and sociologists and political scientists, on the other hand, are bound to
have plenty of problems with this simplistic model of social action.
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